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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Paul Fallon was terminated by his employer, Mercy 
Catholic Medical Center, because he refused to be inoculated 
against flu.  He opposed the flu vaccine because he believed 
that this vaccine might do more harm than good.  However, 
Mercy Catholic required its employees to receive the flu 
vaccine unless they qualified for a medical or religious 
exemption.  In 2014, Fallon sought the exemption on 
religious grounds.  Mercy Catholic ruled that he did not 
qualify and terminated him when he continued to refuse the 
vaccine.  Fallon sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964,1 arguing that his termination constituted religious 
discrimination.  The District Court dismissed his case with 
prejudice because his beliefs, while sincere and strongly held, 
were not religious in nature and, therefore, not protected by 
Title VII.   
 
 In deciding the case, the District Court considered the 
full text of an essay that was partially quoted in Fallon’s 
complaint but not submitted in full until Mercy Catholic 
attached it to the reply brief in support of its motion to 
dismiss.  Fallon now appeals, arguing that his beliefs are 
religious in nature.  He also contends that only the portions of 
the essay, which were quoted in the complaint, should have 
been considered.  Finally, he asserts that the dismissal should 
not have been with prejudice.  We agree, however, with the 
District Court and will affirm. 
                                              
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 
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I. Background2 
 Fallon began his employment with Mercy Catholic as 
a Psychiatric Crisis Intake Worker in September 1994.  In 
2012, Mercy Catholic began requiring employees to obtain a 
flu vaccine or submit an exemption form to obtain a medical 
or religious exemption.  Any employee granted an exemption 
was required to wear a mask as an accommodation.  While 
Fallon does not belong to any religious organization, he holds 
strong personal beliefs, opposing the flu vaccine.  In 2012 and 
2013, Fallon sought and received religious exemptions, based 
on personal beliefs which he explained in a lengthy essay 
attached to his requests for exemption.  In 2014, Fallon made 
a similar request for an exemption, again attaching his essay 
which he described throughout the complaint in this action, as 
“explaining his sincerely held beliefs.”3  His request was 
denied.  Mercy Catholic explained to Fallon that it had 
changed its standards for granting a religious exemption and 
that Fallon’s submission no longer sufficed.  Mercy Catholic 
requested a letter from a clergyperson to support his request 
for an exemption.  Fallon could not provide one.  Fallon was 
suspended and ultimately terminated on December 31, 2014, 
for failing to comply with the flu vaccine requirements. 
 
 On February 19, 2016, Fallon filed a complaint against 
Mercy Catholic for, among other things,4 religious 
                                              
2 Because this case was decided on a motion to dismiss, the 
following facts are drawn from the complaint. 
3 App. 24-30. 
4 Fallon also alleged “wrongful termination” on the basis of 
religion in violation of Title VII.  The discrimination that he 
alleges is his termination so that his “wrongful termination” 
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discrimination and failure to accommodate in violation of 
Title VII.  On June 1, 2016, Mercy Catholic filed a motion to 
dismiss, arguing that Fallon’s beliefs were not religious and 
therefore not protected under Title VII.  Fallon opposed the 
motion to dismiss.  Mercy Catholic submitted a reply brief 
and included, as an attachment, the twenty-two page essay 
that Fallon had attached to his request for religious 
accommodation in 2014.  On July 26, the District Court held 
a two-hour hearing on the motion, at which Fallon argued that 
the District Court could not consider the full essay in relation 
to a motion to dismiss because the full essay was not part of 
the complaint.  On August 9, 2016, partly on the basis of the 
full essay, the District Court granted Mercy Catholic’s motion 
to dismiss.  Because the District Court concluded that 
amendment would be futile, the dismissal was with prejudice. 
 
II. Discussion5 
A. Religious Discrimination 
 Fallon argues that his complaint properly alleges 
religious discrimination in violation of Title VII.  Title VII 
makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
“to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
                                                                                                     
claim does not appear to be independent of his religious 
discrimination claim.  He listed several other counts as well, 
but they were dismissed and Fallon does not appeal their 
dismissal. 
5 Our review of the grant of a motion to dismiss is plenary.  
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 
2009).  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s . . . religion . . ..”6  According to the 
statutory definitions, “[t]he term ‘religion’ includes all 
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, 
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to 
reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective 
employee’s religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”7   
 
 Under Title VII, in order to establish religious 
discrimination, the employee must have shown that (1) he 
held a sincere religious belief that conflicted with a job 
requirement, (2) he informed his employer of the conflict, and 
(3) he was disciplined for failing to comply with the 
conflicting requirement.8  Here, Fallon held a sincere 
opposition to vaccination that conflicted with the requirement 
that he receive the flu vaccine, he informed Mercy Catholic of 
this conflict, and he was terminated for failing to comply with 
the vaccination requirement.  Thus, we are left to consider 
only whether Fallon’s opposition to vaccination is a religious 
belief under Title VII.  If not, he has not pleaded a prima facie 
case.9 
                                              
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
8 Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 
224 (3d Cir. 2000). 
9 Fallon’s failure to accommodate claim also depends on 
Fallon’s views being religious.  See, e.g., Wilkerson v. New 
Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 319 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“To establish a prima facie case of a failure to 
accommodate claim, the employee must show . . . she has a 
7 
 
1. The Definition of “Religion” 
 As we have acknowledged, “[f]ew tasks that confront a 
court require more circumspection than that of determining 
whether a particular set of ideas constitutes a religion . . ..”10  
This task is particularly difficult when we have to determine 
whether a nontraditional faith requires the protections of the 
First Amendment and/or of Title VII.  
 
 In conducting our review, we bear in mind the history 
of the judicial definitions of religion.  In United States v. 
Seeger, while interpreting a conscientious objector statute that 
exempted from conscription those whose religious training 
and belief made them opposed to war in any form, the 
Supreme Court put forward a standard for determining 
whether a belief is religious:  “[D]oes the claimed belief 
occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an 
orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly 
qualified for exemption?”11  With this standard, the Court 
differentiated between those whose views were religious in 
nature and those whose views were “essentially political, 
sociological, or philosophical . . ..”12  The Court stated then, 
and has continued to reiterate ever since, that no court should 
inquire into the validity or plausibility of the beliefs; instead, 
the task of a court is “to decide whether the beliefs professed 
by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in [the 
                                                                                                     
sincere religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement 
. . ..”).   
10 Africa v. Com. of Pa., 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981). 
11 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965). 
12 Id. at 165. 
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believer’s] own scheme of things, religious.”13  Applying the 
same test later in Welsh v. United States, the Court made clear 
that belief in God or divine beings was not necessary; 
nontheistic beliefs could also be religious within the meaning 
of the statute as long as they “occupy in the life of that 
individual ‘a place parallel to that filled by . . . God’ in 
traditionally religious persons.”14 
 
 This Court has specifically considered how a belief 
may occupy a place parallel to that filled by God in 
traditionally religious persons.  In Malnak v. Yogi, confronted 
with this question, Judge Adams in a concurrence 
investigated definitions of religion from the time of the 
Framing of the Constitution.  These definitions tended to 
revolve around belief in God.15  Finding them inadequate, 
                                              
13 Id. at 185; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014) (“[I]t is not for us to say that 
[the believers’] religious beliefs are mistaken or 
insubstantial.”). 
14 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 
176).  Fallon, quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1, argues that 
religious beliefs are moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right 
and wrong that are sincerely held with the strength of 
traditional religious views.  This argument is incorrect.  The 
next sentence of the regulation describes the regulation as 
adopting the standard in Seeger and Welsh.  Hence, we do not 
read the regulation to require only that the beliefs relate to 
“what is right and wrong” and be “sincerely held with the 
strength of traditional religious views.”  They must meet the 
standards in Seeger and Welsh. 
15 592 F.2d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring). 
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Judge Adams proposed a modern definition of religion.16  We 
later adopted this definition in Africa v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, describing it as follows: 
 
First, a religion addresses fundamental and 
ultimate questions having to do with deep and 
imponderable matters. Second, a religion is 
comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-
system as opposed to an isolated teaching. 
Third, a religion often can be recognized by the 
presence of certain formal and external signs.17 
 
This definition has met with considerable agreement.18 
                                              
16 Id. at 207-10. 
17 662 F.2d at 1032. 
18 See Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 102 Cal. 
App. 4th 39, 60-61 (2002) (listing cases).  This definition is 
also in agreement with dictionary definitions.  See, e.g., 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1482 (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
“religion” as “[a] system of faith and worship usu. involving 
belief in a supreme being and usu. containing a moral or 
ethical code; esp., such a system recognized and practiced by 
a particular church, sect, or denomination”); Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.), available at 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/religious 
(defining “religious” as “relating to or manifesting faithful 
devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity”); 
Religious, Dictionary.com, 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/religion (defining 
“religion” as “a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, 
and purpose of the universe, especially when considered as 
10 
 
2. Fallon’s Beliefs 
 Under Africa, we must determine whether Fallon’s 
beliefs “address[] fundamental and ultimate questions having 
to do with deep and imponderable matters,” are 
“comprehensive in nature,” and are accompanied by “certain 
formal and external signs.”19 
 
 Fallon’s beliefs are laid out in the complaint.  First, he 
agrees with a quote, attributed to the founder of Buddhism:   
 
Do not believe in anything simply because you 
have heard it.  Do not believe in anything 
simply because it is spoken and rumored by 
many.  Do not believe in anything merely on the 
authority of your teachers and elders.  Do not 
believe traditions because they have been 
handed down for many generations.  But after 
observation and analysis, when you find that 
anything agrees with reason and is conducive to 
the good and benefit of one and all, then accept 
it and live up to it.20 
 
He believes that “one should not harm their [sic] own body 
and strongly believes that the flu vaccine may do more harm 
                                                                                                     
the creation of a superhuman agency or agencies, usually 
involving devotional and ritual observances, and often 
containing a moral code governing the conduct of human 
affairs”) (last visited Oct. 31, 2017). 
19 Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032. 
20 App. 28.  
11 
 
than good.”21  He concludes that if he yielded to coercion and 
consented to the hospital mandatory policy, he would violate 
his conscience as to what is right and what is wrong.  
Consequently, he must follow his conscience and refuse the 
influenza vaccine.22 
 
 It does not appear that these beliefs address 
fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep 
and imponderable matters, nor are they comprehensive in 
nature.  Generally, he simply worries about the health effects 
of the flu vaccine, disbelieves the scientifically accepted view 
that it is harmless to most people, and wishes to avoid this 
vaccine.  In particular, the basis of his refusal of the flu 
vaccine—his concern that the flu vaccine may do more harm 
than good—is a medical belief, not a religious one.  He then 
applies one general moral commandment (which might be 
paraphrased as, “Do not harm your own body”) to come to 
the conclusion that the flu vaccine is morally wrong.  This 
one moral commandment is an “isolated moral teaching”; by 
itself, it is not a comprehensive system of beliefs about 
fundamental or ultimate matters.23  Thus, we do not believe 
that either of the first two factors in Africa is met here. 
 
 Fallon fares no better under the third factor.  Fallon’s 
views are not manifested in formal and external signs, such as 
“formal services, ceremonial functions, the existence of 
clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, 
                                              
21 Id.  
22 Id. 
23 See Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032. 
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observation of holidays and other similar manifestations 
associated with the traditional religions.”24 
 
 For this reason, because Fallon’s beliefs do not satisfy 
any of the Africa factors, Fallon’s beliefs do not occupy a 
place in his life similar to that occupied by a more traditional 
faith.  His objection to vaccination is therefore not religious 
and not protected by Title VII. 
 
 We note that we are not the only court to come to the 
conclusion that certain anti-vaccination beliefs are not 
religious.25  This is not to say that anti-vaccination beliefs 
cannot be part of a broader religious faith; in some 
circumstances, they can, and in those circumstances, they are 
                                              
24 Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 (Adams, J., concurring). 
25 See Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 51 
(2d Cir. 1988) (upholding as not clearly erroneous a district 
court finding that certain parents’ opposition to vaccination 
was “based, not on religious grounds, but on scientific and 
secular theories”); Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F. Supp. 1259, 1260, 
1265 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (describing a professed belief in 
“chiropractic ethics”—“a body of thought which teaches that 
injection of foreign substances into the body is of no benefit 
and can only be harmful”—as philosophical rather than 
religious); McCartney v. Austin, 298 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1969) (“[A]ppellants’ opposition [to 
vaccination]—whether or not predicated upon their personal 
moral scruples or upon medical concern—is not upon 
religious grounds . . ..”).   
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protected.26  However, Fallon has not presented such 
circumstances here.27 
 
B. The Essay 
 Fallon also argues that the District Court erred in 
considering the essay that Mercy Catholic submitted with its 
reply brief, supporting its motion to dismiss.  Fallon had 
submitted this essay to Mercy Catholic with his request for an 
accommodation and quoted portions of it in his complaint.  
Fallon argues that the essay was outside the pleadings and 
therefore inappropriate to consider in relation to a motion to 
dismiss. 
 
 Ordinarily, a court may not consider documents 
outside the pleadings when deciding a motion to dismiss.  If a 
court wishes to consider documents outside the pleadings, it 
                                              
26 For example, Christian Scientists regularly qualify for 
exemptions from vaccination requirements.  See, e.g., Boone 
v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 947 n.20 (E.D. Ark. 2002); 
Kolbeck v. Kramer, 202 A.2d 889, 891 (N.J. Super. Law. Div. 
1964). 
27 Fallon makes much of the fact that Mercy Catholic 
requested a letter from a clergyperson, but this fact is not 
determinative.  A letter from a clergyperson is not the only 
way to demonstrate that one holds a religious belief.  To the 
extent that Mercy Catholic may have believed that it could 
not be discriminating on the basis of religion if it fired an 
employee who could not produce a letter from a clergyperson, 
it was mistaken.  However, because Fallon’s beliefs are not 
religious, terminating him for acting on his beliefs did not 
constitute religious discrimination. 
14 
 
must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment.28  However, a court may consider a document that 
is “integral to or explicitly relied upon” in the complaint.29  
For example, in Burlington Coat Factory, when a plaintiff 
alleged in a complaint that defendants failed to disclose 
certain facts in publicly issued reports, a court properly 
considered the full texts of the reports when the reports were 
attached to a motion to dismiss.30   
 
 Fallon, in his complaint, quoted portions of this essay 
and described the essay as “explaining his sincerely held 
moral and ethical convictions.”31  Thus, Fallon explicitly 
relied on it, and it was permissible for the District Court to 
consider it.  Fallon suggests that, because the essay was 
attached to a reply brief, not the initial motion to dismiss, he 
was given no opportunity to respond to the letter and explain 
its relevance.  However, the District Court held a two-hour 
hearing after the briefs were submitted.  Anything that Fallon 
needed to explain regarding the letter could have been 
explained then.  Before us, counsel complained that the 
District Court repeatedly cut him off at the hearing, but the 
transcript shows that the District Court cut him off only when 
he attempted to introduce extrinsic evidence not relied upon 
in the complaint.  Thus, we discern no error in the District 
Court’s approach to the essay or to Fallon’s attempts to 
introduce other extrinsic evidence. 
 
                                              
28 In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
1426 (3d Cir. 1997). 
29 Id. (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 
30 Id. at 1426. 
31 App. 25. 
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C. Leave to Amend 
 Fallon also argues that dismissing with prejudice was 
error because he should have been granted leave to amend.  
We review the District Court’s denial of leave to amend for 
futility under an abuse of discretion standard.32  Committing a 
legal error constitutes an abuse of discretion, and futility is a 
legal question.33  Amendment would be futile if the 
complaint, as amended, would nonetheless be subject to 
dismissal for failure to state a claim.34 
 
 Fallon has not proposed any amendments that would 
cure the fundamental deficiency in his claims—that his anti-
vaccination beliefs are not religious in nature.  In light of our 
analysis above, it does not appear that he could do so.  Hence, 
we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to grant leave to amend. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                              
32 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 
243 (3d Cir. 2010).  
33 See id. (observing that futility is determined under the same 
standards as a court would apply under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6)).   
34 See id. 
